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Abstract 
In modern democracies, the representation of voter interests and preferences is primarily the 
job of political parties and their elected officials. These patterns can however change when 
issues are at stake that concern the interests of social groups represented by all relevant parties 
of a political system. In this article we focus on the behavior of female MPs in the parliament 
of Weimar Germany and, thus, in a parliament where legislative party discipline was very 
high. On the basis of a dataset containing information on the legislative voting behavior of 
MPs, we show that gender, even when controlling for a battery of further theoretically derived 
explanatory factors, had a decisive impact on the MPs’ voting behavior on a law proposal to 
curb the spread of sexually transmitted diseases.  
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Introduction 
Within the literature on political representation, it has been frequently argued that women are 
more likely to prioritize particular policy areas once elected to parliament (see e.g. Philips, 
1995; Thomas, 1994). Furthermore, it has also been shown that women and men do not 
always share the same policy priorities (e.g. MacDonald and O’Brien, 2011; Thomas, 1994). 
The question of how constituents are represented by their representatives is a one of the big 
questions in political science, particularly since the publication of the seminal work on 
representation by Hannah F. Pitkin (1967). Empirically, the issue has also received a great 
deal of attention, particularly with regard to the congruence between voters and 
representatives (e.g. Powell, 2004). Over the last two to three decades the topic of differences 
in representation on the basis of gender has garnered increased interest across numerous 
cases, and has also witnessed further theoretical development (e.g. Dahlerup, 2006; Heath, 
Schwindt-Bayer and Taylor-Robinson, 2005; Kittilson, 2006; Norris and Lovenduski, 1995; 
Philips, 1995; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler, 2005; Stegmaier et al. 2013; Thomas, 1994) 
Interestingly, for an issue of this magnitude the evidence supporting the relationships 
almost exclusively hail from the post-1970s, as also lamented by Beckwith (2007: 32). This is 
due in part to the argument that studying women’s representation is a contextual approach, i.e. 
women’s interests are connected to how societies are currently constituted (Wängnerud, 2009: 
53-54), making the topic more likely to concentrate on studies at the current point in time. In 
this article we argue that while keeping the context in mind is indeed important, it is also 
worthwhile to take a study on this particular issue retrospectively. In examining whether 
women legislators pursue a particular representative function, we argue that we should focus 
on their behavior close to the time point when they were granted the right to become political 
representatives and to analyze their behavior within the context of that time period. This 
approach has primarily been the terrain of historians, although in recent years an increasing 
number of studies in political science has also sought out to test theories on historical data 
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(e.g. Aleman and Saiegh 2012; Debus and Hansen, 2010; Hansen and Debus, 2012, 
Schonhardt-Bailey, 2003; Berman, 1997; Lehmann, 2010). It also follows part of the 
suggestion by Beckwith (2007) on creating longitudinal studies to examine what happens 
when the number of female representatives grows over time. While such an approach would 
be the ideal, we also argue that there is value in studying the early years of women’s 
representation in a political system.  
The case of Weimar Germany lends itself particularly well to the study of women in 
parliaments, for it allows us to investigate women’s representation just after enfranchisement. 
In Germany women gained the right to vote in 1918 after the end of World War I and thus had 
parliamentary representation in the Weimar Republic before its demise and the takeover by 
the National Socialists. While there was no point where the share of female MPs exceeded 10 
per cent during this period, both pre- and post-World War I women’s organizations in 
bourgeois and Socialist parties played an important role in German society by emphasizing 
issues on welfare, child care, alcoholism and prostitution (see, e.g., Ellenbrand 1999; Mergel 
2005: 44). Moreover, as we will show in this article, in at least one instance the clear decision 
by a minority of the female MPs resulted in a policy reversal to the detriment of women, 
suggesting a clear case of female MPs being split between primarily representing women’s 
interests over their party and toeing the party line. Previous research has found that while 
there is generally little difference between men and women in terms of policy attitudes, there 
are differences when women’s interests issues are at stake: female representatives must then 
decide between representing their party or their gender (see e.g. Lovenduski and Norris, 2003; 
Norris and Lovenduski, 1995).  
We use a dataset consisting of all roll call votes in the Weimar Republic (see Debus 
and Hansen, 2010; Hansen and Debus, 2012) to study the voting behavior of legislators in the 
early years of the Weimar period. We examine the extent to which there are significant gender 
differences, both in general terms, but also on specific policy areas. We extend this analysis 
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by looking at one recorded vote directly linked to women’s interests in the Weimar years; this 
approach was also used by Cowell-Meyers and Langbein (2009) in their study of US state 
legislatures. Our findings suggest that from the onset of gaining representation, female MPs 
specifically represented women’s interests in the parliament. While the data are far from 
perfect in terms of analyzing intra-party debates that did not result in divergent roll call 
behavior, we nevertheless find support for the idea that gendered representation is something 
that appears across contexts, and that women, to a larger degree than men, are willing to go 
against their party when it comes to issues directly related to women. We structure our article 
with short discussions of social group representation in parliament and women and politics in 
the Weimar Republic, moving on to briefly introduce the data and methodology used. The 
results are followed by a concluding discussion. 
 
Social Group Representation in Parliaments 
The classic representational ideals can be summarized as either representing the individual, 
the group, or the society as a whole (see also Diaz, 2005: 15). The purely individual 
representation view disregards the particularities of the representative, but allows, for 
instance, for the possibility that the representative can represent an abstract ideal, i.e. an 
ideology. In modern politics, it is perhaps a rather naïve view that it is possible to act as a 
group representative without taking social background or gender into account. Indeed, Philips 
(1995) is squarely of the opposite view in her theory of the politics of presence, which argues 
that female politicians are better equipped to represent the interests of women. Here, the 
concept of social group representation is useful. 
 Young (2000) views social groups as the social relations held by members of the 
group with other members of society, and special rights should be given to these groups if 
they are under-represented, for instance in terms of quotas (see also Dahlerup, 2006). For 
Young (2000), social groups are not just based on gender, but could also be race, class, etc. 
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This question speaks also to the more general interest view of representation, whose 
proponents, such as Kymlicka (1996) and also Philips (1995), argue that the mirror 
representation ideal should be avoided and only social groups that have experienced 
systematic discrimination should be given specific rights on a temporary basis.  
 There is little doubt that the systematic under-representation of women in politics has 
occurred and remains the reality. For our study we are not directly concerned with the 
descriptive representation part that addresses for example the number of women actually in 
parliament, but more with how the women elected represent women, or rather, whether their 
representative behavior is different from that of men. However, any study in this area would 
benefit from also looking at substantive representation, i.e. how the number of women elected 
affects the representation of women’s interests (see also Diaz, 2005: 14; Wängnerud, 2009: 
59). It has furthermore been argued that there is an interplay between both parties and various 
interest groups and between the societal structures in increasing the number of women 
elected, thereby influencing the substantive representation for women (Wängnerud, 2009: 52). 
 Whom to represent and how to do it are some of the questions at the core of the 
discussion on women’s representation. This was acutely felt by a female MP for the Catholic 
Centre Party when she was elected in 1919: “What shall I represent? The interests of my party 
or my sex?” (Deutsch, 1920: 6). Koonz (1976) argued that the solution was for the women to 
abstain from votes dealing with women’s interests. As we will show later, this approach was 
not necessarily followed when it came to specific roll call votes dealing with women’s issues.  
 
Women, Political Parties and Politics in the Weimar Republic 
The Weimar Constitution of 1919 proclaimed equality among the sexes. It was assumed that 
the equal political and civil rights would enable women to take an active role in the governing 
and development of the republic, although German women had not primarily focused on 
women’s suffrage at the top of the agenda, instead focusing their energies on exacting social, 
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cultural, and economic change (Koonz, 1976: 665). In terms of numerical representation, 
these hopes were soon dashed: at no point in time during the short lifespan of the Weimar 
Republic did the share of female legislators exceed 10 per cent (Koonz, 1976; see also Mergel 
2005: 104-105).
1
 Most of the women actually elected were part of either the Social Democrats 
(SPD) or the liberal German Democratic Party (DDP; see Mergel 2005: 43-45). This is not 
surprising, as the bourgeois feminist movement was relatively strong in Weimar Germany 
(see Harvey 1995, 2000, 2004); the Social Democratic women’s movement, on the other hand 
was much weaker, yet still present (see Eifert, 1997).
2
 At the same time, both the right-wing 
and left-wing women’s movement shared the same cross-pressure when it came to the role of 
women, i.e. reconciling formal equality with the primacy of motherhood (Eley and 
Grossmann, 1997: 68). In her study of the Social Democratic women’s movement, Eifert 
(1997) further showed that a large number of female legislators during the Weimar years were 
women who had played significant roles in the women’s movements prior World War I. A 
similar pattern was discovered by Harvey (1995) in her study of bourgeois women’s 
movements. 
Studies on voting behavior show that gender was neither a major issue in terms of 
choice of party nor for the patterns of the German party system after 1918 (see, e.g., Falter 
1991). Despite the fact that the number of voters increased drastically due to female suffrage 
between 1912 (the last election for the Reichstag in the Wilhelminian Empire) and 1919/1920 
when the elections for the national assembly and the first Reichstag of the Weimar Republic 
were held, neither party strength nor ideological camps significantly changed. Falter (1991: 
139-154) showed that – in contrast to the explanations of the 1920s and 1930s – women did 
not vote for radical parties like the Communist Party (KPD) or the National Socialists 
(NSDAP) in the elections for the Weimar Reichstag between 1924 and 1933. Instead, female 
voters tended to support religious or conservative parties and were markedly underrepresented 
among KPD and NSDAP voters. This finding demonstrates that other factors might structure 
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voting behavior, party competition, and legislative decision-making of political actors in 
Weimar Germany. One theoretical account that helps us to explain the persistence of the 
German party system since the late 19
th
 century refers to cleavage theory (Lipset and Rokkan 
1967; see also Hansen and Debus 2012: 711-713). According to this theoretical concept, 
German society can generally be described as having two distinct societal cleavages; the state 
vs. the Catholic Church and workers vs. capital. The former was prominent in the cultural 
battles of the 1870s and 1880s during the infancy of the German state and was the primary 
driver in the formation of the party representing German Roman Catholics: the Centre Party. 
The latter cleavage led to the formation of the Social Democratic Party and, much later, the 
Communist Party.  
 Scholars usually describe the German party system until 1933 as having been grouped 
around four or five so-called ‘milieus’ (Lepsius, 1993; Peukert, 1987). It is possible to 
distinguish between two categories of milieus: the individually oriented vs. the organizational 
(Pyta, 1997: 208-213). Within the person-centered milieu we find two liberal parties: the more 
right-wing German People’s Party (DVP) and the more left-wing Democratic Party (DDP)3. 
These two parties are usually seen to represent urban and bourgeois groups. Also a person-
centered party, but much more focused on the agrarian-rural groups, was the national-
conservative DNVP, which sought to restore the monarchy and autocracy. 
 Strong organizations and less focus on personality characterized the Socialist and 
Catholic milieus. Founded on the network of labor unions and the Roman Catholic Church, 
respectively, the late 19
th
 century saw the formation and increased success of the Social 
Democratic Party (SPD) and the Centre Party (Z). The Social Democrats witnessed a split in 
1917 when the Independent Social Democrats (USPD) broke apart, with one group joining the 
newly established Communists (KPD) in 1920 and most of the remaining group returning to 
the SPD in 1922 and 1923. In comparison to the other parties, the Centre Party did not 
compete for votes in Bavaria, where it was linked to the Bavarian People’s Party (BVP), a 
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party which did not share the positive view of the republic held by most of the legislators 
from the Centre Party. 
These considerations imply that legislative party discipline was high across all parties 
represented in the Reichstag, in particular in case of the parties originating from the 
organizational milieus (see also Debus and Hansen, 2010; Hansen and Debus, 2012). We 
would therefore expect that – regardless of the policy area a parliamentary vote belongs to – 
MPs of the Weimar Reichstag would follow the party line in almost all recorded votes, here 
all votes from 1920 until 1924, in particular if they were members of a parliamentary party 
group that represented a party from the ‘organizational milieus’, i.e. SPD, KPD, and the 
Catholic Centre Party (H1).
4
    
This perspective, however, ignores the fact that MPs might be influenced by factors 
other than party politics when voting in parliament. As Carey (2009) put it, MPs may face 
several principals when acting in parliament. Such agents can be, for instance, the preferences 
of the voters and/or party supporters in the constituency that the MP represents or the 
geographical area the respective MP comes from. Whether an MP attaches more weight to the 
position of his or her party or to interests of the constituency (s)he represents largely depends 
on the type of the electoral system (e.g. Carey and Shugart 1995; Shugart et al. 2005; Sieberer 
2010; Bowler 2010; Bräuninger et al. 2012; Hug and Martin 2012). Research analyzing the 
decisions of individual MPs has also shown that their legislative behavior is shaped not only 
by pressure from their constituency and party, but also by their own personal background. 
This line of reasoning can be traced back to the early 1960s (Matthew 1960, Woshinsky 1973) 
and has more recently been picked up by Searing (1994) with respect to parliamentary roles 
played by MPs. Searing’s motivational conception of MPs’ preferences (Blomgren and 
Rozenberg 2012) differs from the approach described in the previous section mainly with 
regard to the determinants of these preferences. These preferences are not exclusively career 
goals, but may also be “emotional incentives” (Searing 1994: 19). 
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While Searing’s work focuses on explaining differing patterns of MPs’ behavior, i.e. 
the parliamentary roles played by MPs, Burden (2007) has used a similar line of reasoning to 
explain the legislative behavior of members of the US Congress. He argues that personal 
background and experience are important in the formation of parliamentarians’ policy 
preferences. By focusing on a small set of issues, he shows that a legislator’s personal 
experiences as well as his or her ethnicity, gender, and further personal characteristics 
influence legislative behavior and patterns of legislative decision-making.
5
 The focus on 
personal characteristics, especially gender, is supported by the organizational environment of 
the political parties in the Weimar Republic. Most of the major parties in Weimar Germany 
had special women’s interest organizations, which were – in case of the national-conservative 
parties like the DNVP – also rooted in the Protestant Church and already existed prior to 
women’s suffrage in 1919. While the female MPs from the liberal parties cooperated with 
female representatives from the Social Democrats and Socialists in case of general questions 
on the equal treatment of woman, female MPs from the DDP and DVP often worked together 
with their fellow female colleagues from the conservative DNVP on conflictual societal 
questions that addressed family or moral issues (e.g. Willing 2005; Schüler 2008). To test 
these considerations empirically, we need to move away from a more general level – as in 
case of our first hypothesis – to a more particular level so that we can examine only those 
votes where women’s interest were – directly or indirectly – at stake. We hypothesize that – 
despite the generally high degree of legislative party discipline in the Weimar Reichstag – 
female MPs were more likely to deviate from the party line when women’s interests were at 
stake (H2). 
This hypothesis necessitates a brief discussion of what was seen as women’s interests 
during the Weimar years. While it might be tempting to use modern day definitions of 
women’s interests, it would be incorrect, as those issues which currently constitute women’s 
interests are the progeny of the battles fought by previous generations of women. Therefore, 
10 
 
to correctly identify what both male and female politicians of the Weimar Republic defined as 
women’s interests, we must look further back in time. Pore (1981) lists a number of such 
issues, which include discrimination against women, access to birth control, abortion reform, 
marriage and divorce reform, and general protection of women. Alongside the historical 
studies we find the two works by Regine Deutsch (1920; 1923) who, as a woman and a 
politician, had direct access to the women elected to the Weimar Parliaments. Deutsch (1920; 
1923) argues that – in addition to the areas mentioned by Pore (1981) – labor market rights for 
women, free access to all professions for women, social help for families as well as the 
limitation of sexually transmitted diseases and women’s rights are of also of particular 
interests to women. The latter policy area – i.e. STDs as an example of women’s rights – is of 
key interest for the present study since it touches the virtue of women, an issue that was 
emphasized by Christian, Jewish and conservative women interest groups in particular, but 
also by women interest groups attached to the Social Democrats or to the liberal parties 
(Ellenbrand 1999: 41-43). 
The law against sexually transmitted diseases was a primary component of the 
legislative agenda from 1920 until 1927. Despite its frequent occurrence on the legislative 
agenda, proposals relating to the law rarely made it to roll call votes, which is similar to many 
of the other women’s issues defined by female politicians in the Weimar Republic. One 
recorded vote on the topic was held in June 1923 concerning the content of a law proposal on 
reforming the regulation of sexually transmitted diseases. While the original proposal 
explicitly prohibited people to consult persons other than approbated doctors for medication, a 
group of male and female MPs from the Catholic Centre Party, both liberal parties, and the 
national-conservative DNVP introduced an amendment to the proposed law that, had it 
received a parliamentary majority, would have resulted in a softened version of the law. The 
amendment would have allowed persons (primarily women) to contact persons other than 
doctors in the case of emergency. This amendment would have helped the situation of people 
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in rural areas as well as people who feared contacting doctors, since doctors had to officially 
report the diagnosis of a sexually transmitted disease to the authorities. This amendment 
would have also had a significant impact on – mostly female – sex workers, the position of 
women within society – since their virtuousness, which was a highly important issue in 
particular for women during that time period, would have been significantly damaged if they 
were infected by STDs (Ellenbrand 1999: 72-81) – and would have impacted the personal 
rights of these persons in discussions with the police. The latter aspects were the reason why 
also liberal and SPD MPs were in favor of a more permissive policy on STDs and, thus, of the 
amendment (see Willing, 2005; Schüler, 2008). Because the vote on this amendment is the 
legislative proposal on women’s issues where the MPs’ voting behavior was recorded, we use 
this case in order to test whether personal characteristics of MPs, such as their gender, had an 
effect on legislative behavior.  
 
Data and Methodology 
Using roll call votes for the analysis of parliamentary behavior is not novel; for studies of the 
United States Congress, this approach has been the norm for at least the last 20 years (see also 
Poole and Rosenthal, 1997). Studies of roll call votes in the Weimar Republic have also 
recently been undertaken by Debus and Hansen (2010), Hansen and Debus (2012), and 
Lehmann (2010). While there are benefits of using roll call votes, how they are requested and 
how representative they are warrants a short discussion of how and when roll calls can be 
implemented (see also Saalfeld 1995). 
In the Weimar parliaments, a roll call vote could be called following §105 of the 
Standing Order of the parliament when at least 50 attending members requested such a vote 
(Markmann 1955: 22). Because the number of MPs increased from 459 in the first legislative 
period (from 1920 to 1924) to 577 in 1930 (reaching 608 in July 1932), it is assumed to have 
been easier for MPs to get the required support for calling a recorded vote: While in 1920 
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almost 11 per cent of the Reichstag members had to ask for a roll-call vote, the share of 
required MPs decreased significantly over time. Moreover, in a few cases, §106 of the 
Standing Order of the Reichstag prohibited recorded votes. Roll call votes were not allowed 
for certain procedural aspects, such as on matters pertaining to the number of members in a 
committee or the length, agenda, and postponement of a parliamentary session. Thus, the 
Standing Order of the Reichstag was but a minor obstacle to hindering requests for a recorded 
vote. For the analysis, we made use of a dataset that not only contains all roll call votes from 
1920 to 1933, but also the personal characteristics and political functions like positions within 
the government of all Reichstag MPs (see Debus and Hansen 2010; Hansen and Debus 2012).  
While the roll call votes are not the entire population of votes cast in the Weimar 
parliaments, they are the subset of votes where a sufficient number of MPs found a given 
topic of debate to be salient enough to request a vote by roll call. Given the nature of our 
hypotheses, we use the Rice index (Rice, 1925) as a measure of agreement between the MPs 
in a party. The index ranges between 0 and 1, with 1 indicating no disagreement between the 
MPs in a party. In the first part of our analysis we focus on testing our first hypothesis, which 
is based on all recorded votes from the first legislative period of the Reichstag (1920 to 1924). 
We test our second hypothesis by examining the vote in June 1923 on the permissive 
amendment on the law proposal dealing with sexually transmitted diseases. The first 
legislative period from 1920 until 1924 is of interest not only because it was in this when the 
roll call vote on the STD issue took place, but also due to the fact that the time period marked 
the onset of the Weimar parliaments. The tumultuous period after the Armistice and the 
Treaty of Versailles and the ensuing chaos and instability that overtook Germany is, to some 
extent, an indicator that the country yearned for stability. At the same time, this period is the 
first in which women were elected and served as parliamentary representatives. We have 
previously argued that scholarship interested in female legislators often ignores the origins of 
their tenure and instead tends to focus only on more recent times, as also discussed by 
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Beckwith (2007). Analyzing the voting behavior of female MPs and comparing them with 
their male counterparts in the infancy of a political system allows us to explore the impact of 
gender at a time point when political socialization was expected to be less developed among 
women than for men (see also Searing, 1994). 
 
Results 
The analysis proceeds in two stages. First we explore the overall mean cohesion scores of the 
parties divided by gender and policy area, both descriptively and in a multivariate setting. 
Second, we explore the vote in June 1923 terms of cohesion and bivariate analysis, moving on 
to a multivariate analysis. In this last step we can also control for a number of factors that are 
generally used in the theoretically based analysis of legislative voting (see, e.g. Hix et al. 
2006). 
 Our first hypothesis dealt with the MPs’ party membership and the cohesion scores. It 
was argued that a generally high level of cohesiveness would be expected, although much 
more explicit among the parties belonging to the “organizational milieus”, i.e. Social 
Democrats, Catholics, and Communists. In Table 1 we show the mean party cohesion scores 
for all recorded votes that took place in the first legislative period of the Reichstag from 1920 
until 1924.  
 
--- Table 1 about here --- 
 
The results support the first hypothesis: Parties generally have a high level of cohesion; and 
all parties except the DDP have a score over 0.9. The parties in the organizational milieus are, 
for the most part, more cohesive than the other parties, with the exception of the Catholic 
Centre Party (Z) and the Bavarian Peoples Party (BVP). One reason for this finding might be 
that the religious component and the close connection to the Roman-Catholic Church held 
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both parties together (Lösche 1994: 79). In social structural terms, the parties – in particular 
the Centre Party – consisted of all social groups, such as blue- and white collar workers, civil 
servants, and the self-employed, which can have diverging preferences for economic, 
financial, or welfare policies. Unsurprisingly, the Communist KPD has perfect party cohesion, 
i.e. no communist MP strayed from the party line. The Social Democrats also have a near 
perfect score with 0.997, suggesting only a few votes or a few MPs went against the party.  
 While the descriptive analysis presents one view on the hypothesized relationship, it is 
necessary to introduce a multivariate analysis to fully explore the extent to which MPs from 
parties with a basis in the organizational milieus toe the party line more than MPs from non-
milieu parties. The multivariate results, which are based on a Tobit model since our dependent 
variable – the Rice index scores – varies only between 0 and 1,6 corroborates the descriptive 
parts (see Table 2 below): all other major party groups are less cohesive than SPD as an 
example of a party belonging to the organizational milieu. The exception here was the 
Communist Party (KPD) which – given its perfect party cohesiveness – cannot become more 
cohesive.  
 
--- Table 2 about here --- 
 
Given that there are some differences between the parties and that our first hypothesis is 
confirmed, we can now move on to explaining why these differences between and within the 
parties exist. The first part of this analysis can be found in Table 3 where the Rice scores are 
divided by gender and policy area to compare whether there is a difference between men and 
women in terms how cohesive they are and the extent to which this is based on specific policy 
areas.  
 
--- Table 3 about here --- 
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Generally, women are more cohesive than men, scoring around 1 percentage higher on the 
Rice index. The differences in means of the Rice index scores between male and female MPs 
are statistically significant according to a t-test. This is the case across most policy areas that 
we can control for, although for few areas men are more cohesive than women in the Weimar 
Reichstag from 1920 until 1924. The difference between male and female MPs on foreign 
policy is – likewise to votes related to agriculture and trade as well as to procedural rules – 
not statistically significant on conventional levels. This is not surprising, given that we know 
from more recent research on gender and representation that foreign policy is often assumed 
to be a “hard” policy area where women are less likely to be involved (e.g., Bäck et al. 2013). 
This difference, albeit limited, would also indicate that this type of explanation also held true 
in the early days of the Weimar Republic.  
 
This finding suggests that it is useful to move from the general party-level to the specific MP-
level and to examine whether women vote differently than men on specific issues. 
Establishing a particular policy as specifically male is hard. Conscription would be one such 
element, yet as this was abolished as part of the Treaty of Versailles, there were no votes on 
this issue in parliament. However, as we mentioned above, there was at least one policy up for 
deliberation that was of particular interest to women. The proposal we examine here 
prohibited people from seeking medical attention for STDs from anyone except approbated 
doctors. The amendment proposed would have allowed people to contact persons other than 
doctors in emergency situations. This was especially important for rural areas where there 
were very few doctors, and of those doctors, they were generally known to those seeking care. 
Moreover, doctors were required to report cases of sexually transmitted diseases to the 
authorities, so that the virtuousness and, thus, the position of male and in particular female 
persons in society in general and in their personal surrounding in particular would have been 
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damaged or even destroyed (Ellenbrand 1999: 3-5). Had the proposal passed, it would have 
been a progressive step forward for the rights of women and their position within society in 
the first half of the 20
th
 century. The only recorded vote on this issue was on this particular 
amendment, and the proposal failed. The distribution of votes between the parties can be 
found in Table 4 between men and women in Table 5. 
 
--- Table 4 about here --- 
 
The parties were split in terms of their attitudes towards the amendment. Only the KPD voted 
as a unitary actor, whereas all other parties saw splits of varying magnitude, with the 
conservative DNVP split 70 to 30 per cent in favor of the amendment. While the differences 
within the parties could be due to multiple reasons, for our argument, however, one particular 
factor is of primary interests, namely gender.  
 
--- Table 5 about here --- 
 
The proposed amendment failed by 12 votes, the same number of women who voted against 
the amendment, 11 of which were Social Democrats and one Communist. Whereas only the 
women of the Social Democratic Party were split on the issues, all women from the traditional 
bourgeois parties voted in favor of the progressive amendment. Thus, although the group of 
women looks divided when taking the total into account, i.e. 14 for and 12 against, this must 
be qualified as the main body of opposition was a part of the Social Democratic women. This 
suggests that in order to fully understand the factors influencing the voting decision, we 
should move beyond the bivariate analysis to a multivariate design where possible 
confounding factors can be controlled for. This approach is presented in Table 6.  
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--- Table 6 about here --- 
 
The multivariate logistic regression analysis corroborates the patterns discussed previously. 
Overall, women are – even when controlling for other personal characteristics of MPs like age 
or religious affiliation – significantly more likely to vote in favor of the amendment than men. 
In substantive the terms, the chances that male MPs voted for the amendment was at 46%, 
while the probability that female MPs voted for the amendment is at 70% according to 
estimates on the basis of model 1. When comparing this finding to the interaction between 
cohesiveness and gender, which is introduced in model 2, we see that women vote 
significantly more in line with their party than men—which makes the decision by so many 
women to deviate from their party line in this particular vote even more fascinating (see also 
Figure 1).  
 
--- Figure 1 about here --- 
 
Model 3 introduces an interaction term between gender and membership in the SPD 
parliamentary party. In contrast to the results from the second model presented in table 6, we 
find no evidence that female SPD MPs were significantly more likely to vote for the 
permissive bill.    
We also find that Jewish MPs were much more in favor than non-denominational, 
Roman-Catholic, or Protestant MPs. This is somewhat surprising against the background of 
our finding that it is among the bourgeois parties where the support for the amendment was 
strongest. The explanation for this finding– in addition to the generally stronger liberal and 
progressive orientation within the Jewish community in Germany, which was mirrored in the 
activities Jewish politicians within liberal or socialist parties (see, e.g. Liepach 1996: 30-43) – 
can be traced back to the profession and general position on sexual medicine of one Jewish 
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MP. While Ludwig Haas, a Jewish MP from the DDP, abstained from the vote, the two 
remaining Jewish MPs in the legislative period from 1920 to 1924 – Julius Moses and Hugo 
Heimann, both members of the SPD – were split on the vote; Moses voted in favor and 
Heimann against. While Heimann was the chair of the important budget committee and thus 
had to support the party position to vote against the amendment because of his position within 
the parliamentary party leadership, Julius Moses was a doctor and supported sex education 
and the promotion of sexual hygiene throughout his parliamentary career in the Weimar 
Republic. One of the arguments that were given in favor of the amendment was that it would 
help the rural areas where doctors were scarce and people would have to travel far distances 
to receive professional medical help.
7
 However, this does not translate into a significant 
relationship when we control for the rurality of the electoral district: Members from such 
district are no more or less likely to vote in favor of the amendment.
8
 We also control for the 
sum of the vote shares of the Centre Party, the DDP, the DVP, and the DNVP in our analysis 
since members from these parties MPs initiated the amendment on the STD issue. The higher 
the combined share of these parties is in the respective constituencies, the more likely it is that 
MPs representing these constituencies will follow their fellow MPs in supporting the 
amendment, as it should strengthen their position within the own party and the chances to get 
re-elected (e.g. Strøm and Müller, 1999). The effect of this variable, however, is neither 
significant nor has a positive direction. Nevertheless, there is a strong impact of MPs party 
affiliation: Compared to MPs from the DNVP, which serve as the reference group in the 
regression analysis, MPs from the Centre Party, the DDP, and the DVP are significantly more 
likely to vote for the permissive amendment, while MPs that belong to the SPD and the 
Bavarian Peoples Party are significantly less likely to vote in favor of the amendment. This 
suggests that the main drivers of the amendment were party political, although the split among 
women for the Social Democrats was the main reason the amendment failed. 
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 We can move beyond mere speculation when it comes to understanding why a large 
part of the SPD women voted against the amendment. There is good reason to believe that the 
party attempted to keep everyone in line due to a desire for the government to fall. The 
government at the time, led by Chancellor Cuno, was a motley coalition between various 
independents, Conservatives, and Centrists. The coalition had only been in power for a short 
period of time, taking over a coalition in which the Social Democrats had taken part. Indeed, 
when the Cuno government fell in August 1923, the Social Democrats once again joined a 
coalition with the Centre Party and both liberal parties. The 11 social democratic women were 
in all likelihood following the party dictate, while the four women who voted for the 
amendment took a risk by putting the interests of their gender above those of the party. 
However, three of the four female SPD MPs that voted in favor of the amendment got re-
elected
9
, indicating that deviating from the party line on an issue that can be labeled as 
‘moral’ or ‘ethical’ was less problematic for the party leadership.   
 
Conclusion 
In this article, we discussed the impact of gender on legislative decision-making in a political 
system where women had just recently gained the right to vote and to occupy political offices. 
By focusing on the first years of the Weimar Republic and the legislative process in the 
German parliament, we selected one recorded vote on an amendment that would – had it been 
enacted – have increased the rights of persons seeking medical treatment for STDs (in 
particular women) in terms of their treatment by the state. On the basis of a dataset containing 
information on the voting behavior of all MPs of the Weimar Reichstag and their personal 
characteristics during 1920 to 1924, we could show that female MPs did not always follow 
the party position when the interests of women were at stake. The analysis of a recorded vote 
on an amendment that would have given more leeway to persons seeking medical care for 
sexually transmitted diseases has shown that female MPs were split on the issue. Those MPs 
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from liberal, religious and conservative parties, and a handful of social democrats, voted for 
the proposal, so that the concerned persons, which were mostly women, had more leeway to 
treat their diseases, which, in addition, increased their chances not to lose their position within 
society because of “lost virtuousness”. The majority of social democratic women and the sole 
female communist MP voted against the amendment.  
Our analysis reveals that gender was – at least in this particular legislative roll call 
vote – a decisive factor in explaining the individual behavior of MPs in the Weimar Republic, 
despite the general high degree of party unity in the parliament of the first German republic. 
We thus can conclude that interests of MPs originating from the personal characteristics 
played a role in newly created democracies with strong and dominant political parties. We can 
also conclude that especially on the left end of the political spectrum, the question of whether 
to represent one’s gender or one’s party led to a split, whereas the liberal, conservative and 
religious side was not split. It is, however, not possible to fully establish whether this was due 
to women’s interests overlapping with the particular proposal; it does seem to be likely, as the 
women from these parties were united. 
These findings have implications for further studies. Since the treatment of social 
diseases was also discussed in other European countries during that time period (since the 
numbers of STDs increased dramatically during and after of the First World War), it would be 
interesting to study whether female MPs after women’s suffrage displayed similar behavior in 
other political systems like the US or the UK where party discipline was – and still is, due to 
the electoral system – generally lower. Were female MPs more active in the legislative 
process, e.g. by giving speeches or by introducing law proposals, when the interests of women 
were – directly or indirectly – on the agenda? Were female MPs significantly less active in the 
first years or decades after women’s suffrage, and are there differences between political 
contexts and institutional structures of political systems? These topics would not only be of 
interest for scholars interested in the specific countries, but would also help us to establish the 
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full extent to which gendered representation has evolved across time and institutions, thereby 
addressing some the issues discussed by Beckwith (2007) as missing from the study of gender 
and representation. To answer these questions, a broader perspective is required that includes 
quantitative research on ‘historical’ parliaments from the time period after women were 
allowed to enter the political arena. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
 
Table 1:  Mean party cohesion scores (Rice index) of votes 1920-24 by party 
 
 SPD Z DVP DDP DNVP KPD BVP 
All recorded 
votes 1920-1924 
.997 .944 .959 .882 .94 1 .914 
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Table 2:  Party-specfic determinants of party cohesion scores (Rice index) for all 
parliamentary votes in the time period between 1920 until 1924 
 
 OLS regression model Tobit regression model 
Party affiliation of MPs   
Centre Party -0.05
**
 
(0.00) 
-0.35
**
 
(0.01) 
DVP -0.04
**
 
(0.00) 
-0.26
**
 
(0.01) 
DDP -0.11
**
 
(0.00) 
-0.57
**
 
(0.01) 
DNVP -0.06
**
 
(0.00) 
-0.40
**
 
(0.01) 
KPD 0.00
**
 
(0.00) 
1.95 
(.) 
BVP -0.08
**
 
(0.00) 
-0.34
**
 
(0.01) 
Constant 1.00
**
 
(0.00) 
1.66
**
 
(0.01) 
sigma  0.43
**
 
(0.01) 
N 24271 24271 
AIC -26657.00 17818.80 
R² 0.06  
Pseudo R²  0.11 
Comments: Estimates from a OLS (left hand) and Tobit model (right hand; lower limt is set to ‘0’, upper limit is 
set to ‘1’); robust standard errors (clustered by MP) in parentheses. The dependent variable reflects the Rice 
index score for each parliamentary party and legislative vote; reference group are SPD MPs; 
+
 p < 0.10, 
*
 p < 
0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01 
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Table 3:  Mean party cohesion scores (Rice index) of votes 1920-24 distributed by 
gender and by policy area 
 
 Male Female 
All recorded votes 1920-1924 .955** .964** 
Votes that relate to…   
…Economy .950* .960* 
…Domestic affairs .954* .964* 
…Foreign affairs .991 .984 
…Agriculture and trade .943 .958 
…Confidence votes and procedural votes .986 .989 
Comments: Differences in means (t-test) between male and female MPs are significant at 5%-level (*) and 1%-
level (**). 
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Table 4:  Results of the recorded vote on the permissive amendment on the law 
 proposal dealing with sexually transmitted diseases by selected parliamentary 
party groups 
 
 
 SPD Z DVP DDP DNVP KPD BVP Total 
         
No 104 4 2 3 15 10 8 151 
% 90.4 11.1 4.8 13.6 31.3 100 80 51.9 
         
Yes 11 32 40 19 33 0 2 140 
% 9.6 88.9 95.2 86.4 68.7 0 20 48.1 
         
Total 115 36 42 22 48 10 10 291 
% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
27 
 
Table 5:  Results of the recorded vote on the permissive amendment on the law proposal dealing with STDs by selected parliamentary party 
groups and by gender 
 
 
 
SPD Z DVP DDP DNVP KPD BVP Total 
 Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
No 93 11 4 0 2 0 3 0 15 0 9 1 8 0 139 12 
% 93 73.3 11.4 0 5.1 0 15 0 34.1 0 100 100 80 0 52.5 46.2 
                 
Yes 7 4 31 1 37 3 17 2 29 4 0 0 2 0 126 14 
% 7 26.7 88.6 100 94.9 100 85 100 65.9 100 0 0 20 0 47.5 53.8 
                 
Total 100 15 35 1 39 3 20 2 44 4 9 1 10 0 265 26 
% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 0 100 100 
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Table 6: Determinants of voting for the permissive amendment on the law proposal 
dealing with sexually transmitted diseases 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Personal characteristics of MPs    
Female MPs 2.44
**
 
(0.83) 
18.52
**
 
(7.18) 
1.86
*
 
(0.78) 
Rice index scores (1920-1924)  
 
-3.56
*
 
(1.48) 
-3.78
*
 
(1.56) 
Rice index scores (1920-1924) x female MPs  
 
-19.46
*
 
(8.14) 
 
 
Age -0.28 
(0.24) 
-0.27 
(0.24) 
-0.27 
(0.24) 
Age (squared) 0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
Catholic 0.77 
(0.77) 
-0.05 
(0.96) 
0.03 
(0.96) 
Protestant 1.83
**
 
(0.45) 
0.63 
(0.69) 
0.75 
(0.70) 
Jewish 3.24
**
 
(0.68) 
3.16
**
 
(0.73) 
3.15
**
 
(0.74) 
Partisan affiliation of MPs    
SPD -2.19
**
 
(0.41) 
-2.04
**
 
(0.47) 
-1.88
**
 
(0.49) 
SPD x Female MPs  
 
 
 
0.92 
(1.15) 
BVP -1.57
*
 
(0.65) 
-2.00
**
 
(0.71) 
-1.99
**
 
(0.71) 
DDP 1.63
*
 
(0.81) 
2.51
**
 
(0.88) 
2.58
**
 
(0.90) 
Centre Party 2.93
**
 
(0.76) 
3.78
**
 
(1.02) 
3.91
**
 
(1.04) 
DVP 2.60
**
 
(0.63) 
4.20
**
 
(0.93) 
4.27
**
 
(0.96) 
Control variables    
Rurality of constituency 0.07 
(0.06) 
0.10 
(0.06) 
0.09 
(0.06) 
Vote share of Z, DDP, DVP, DNVP in constituency -0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
Constant 4.42 
(6.23) 
7.18 
(6.50) 
7.36 
(6.51) 
N 291 291 291 
Pseudo R² 0.51 0.53 0.53 
Log pseudolikelihood -98.65 -93.94 -94.55 
AIC 223.31 217.88 219.09 
Comments: Members from the DNVP are the reference category. Standard errors (clustered by constituency) in 
parentheses; 
+
 p < 0.10, 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01
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Figure 1: Effect of party cohesion on the probability to vote for the permissive 
amendment on STD by gender  
 
 
Comment: Estimation based on model 2 from table 7. 
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Notes 
                                                 
1
 However, for the Social Democrats (SPD) the percentage were never below 10 per cent, 
ranging between 14 and 11 per cent. 
2
 Incidentally, these movements collapsed as soon as the National Socialists gained power in 
1933, see also Evans (1976). 
3
 This party became the German State Party in 1930 (Deutsche Staatspartei, DStP). 
4 
We refrain from including the MPs from the Independent Social Democratic Party (USPD) 
in the analysis since the USPD dissolved itself in 1922 and 1923. The larger right-wing part of 
this party moved back to the SPD, while the smaller left wing of the USPD merged with the 
Communist Party (see, e.g., Lösche 1994). 
5 
For recent empirical studies, see Bäck, Debus and Müller (2013) and Baumann, Debus and 
Müller (2013). 
6
 We have run the model as OLS, the results are also presented in Table 2, and similar relationships is found as is 
the case for the Tobit. 
7
 The degree of rurality also serves as a proxy for local problem pressure regarding STDs. 
While it would be ideal to use the actual incidence of STDs in the respective constituencies to 
precisely measure local problem pressure, these data are unfortunately not reported in the 
statistical yearbooks of the German statistical office in the 1920s and 1930s.  
8
 The data on the degree of rurality in a constituency stems from the study by Falter and 
Hänisch (1990). 
9
 One exception was Adele Schreiber-Krieger; she returned to the Reichstag in 1928 and 
again became a member of the social democratic parliamentary party group.  
